This is very much implementation specific, but the general idea is to allow providers to issue short term access tokens with long term refresh tokens. Why?

• Many providers support bearer tokens which are very weak security-wise. By making them short-lived and requiring refresh, they limit the time an attacker can abuse a stolen token.
• Large scale deployment don t want to perform a database lookup every API call, so instead they issue self-encoded access token which can be verified by decryption. However, this also means there is no way to revoke these tokens so they are issued for a short time and must be refreshed.
• The refresh token requires client authentication which makes it stronger. Unlike the above access tokens, it is usually implemented with a database lookup.

A couple of scenarios might help illustrate the purpose of access and refresh tokens and the engineering trade-offs in designing an oauth2 (or any other auth) system:

Web app scenario

In the web app scenario you have a couple of options:

1. if you have your own session management, store both the access_token and refresh_token against your session id in session state on your session state service. When a page is requested by the user that requires you to access the resource use the access_token and if the access_token has expired use the refresh_token to get the new one.

Let s imagine that someone manages to hijack your session. The only thing that is possible is to request your pages.

2. if you don t have session management, put the access_token in a cookie and use that as a session. Then, whenever the user requests pages from your web server send up the access_token. Your app server could refresh the access_token if need be.

Comparing 1 and 2:

In 1, access_token and refresh_token only travel over the wire on the way between the authorzation server (google in your case) and your app server. This would be done on a secure channel. A hacker could hijack the session but they would only be able to interact with your web app. In 2, the hacker could take the access_token away and form their own requests to the resources that the user has granted access to. Even if the hacker gets a hold of the access_token they will only have a short window in which they can access the resources.

Either way the refresh_token and clientid/secret are only known to the server making it impossible from the web browser to obtain long term access.

Let s imagine you are implementing oauth2 and set a long timeout on the access token:

In 1) There s not much difference here between a short and long access token since it s hidden in the app server. In 2) someone could get the access_token in the browser and then use it to directly access the user s resources for a long time.

Mobile scenario

On the mobile, there are a couple of scenarios that I know of:

1. Store clientid/secret on the device and have the device orchestrate obtaining access to the user s resources.

2. Use a backend app server to hold the clientid/secret and have it do the orchestration. Use the access_token as a kind of session key and pass it between the client and the app server.

Comparing 1 and 2

In 1) Once you have clientid/secret on the device they aren t secret any more. Anyone can decompile and then start acting as though they are you, with the permission of the user of course. The access_token and refresh_token are also in memory and could be accessed on a compromised device which means someone could act as your app without the user giving their credentials. In this scenario the length of the access_token makes no difference to the hackability since refresh_token is in the same place as access_token. In 2) the clientid/secret nor the refresh token are compromised. Here the length of the access_token expiry determines how long a hacker could access the users resources, should they get hold of it.

Expiry lengths

Here it depends upon what you re securing with your auth system as to how long your access_token expiry should be. If it s something particularly valuable to the user it should be short. Something less valuable, it can be longer.

Some people like google don t expire the refresh_token. Some like stackflow do. The decision on the expiry is a trade-off between user ease and security. The length of the refresh token is related to the user return length, i.e. set the refresh to how often the user returns to your app. If the refresh token doesn t expire the only way they are revoked is with an explicit revoke. Normally, a log on wouldn t revoke.

Hope that rather length post is useful.

In addition to the other responses:

Once obtained, Access Tokens are typically sent along with every request from Clients to protected Resource Servers. This induce a risk for access token stealing and replay (assuming of course that access tokens are of type "Bearer" (as defined in the initial RFC6750).

Examples of those risks, in real life:

• Resource Servers generally are distributed application servers and typically have lower security levels compared to Authorization Servers (lower SSL/TLS config, less hardening, etc.). Authorization Servers on the other hand are usually considered as critical Security infrastructure and are subject to more severe hardening.

• Access Tokens may show up in HTTP traces, logs, etc. that are collected legitimately for diagnostic purposes on the Resource Servers or clients. Those traces can be exchanged over public or semi-public places (bug tracers, service-desk, etc.).

• Backend RS applications can be outsourced to more or less trustworthy third-parties.

The Refresh Token, on the other hand, is typically transmitted only twice over the wires, and always between the client and the Authorization Server: once when obtained by client, and once when used by client during refresh (effectively "expiring" the previous refresh token). This is a drastically limited opportunity for interception and replay.

Last thought, Refresh Tokens offer very little protection, if any, against compromised clients.

It is essentially a security measure. If your app is compromised, the attacker will only have access to the short-lived access token and no way to generate a new one.

Refresh tokens also expire but they are supposed to live much longer than the access token.

I ve written a little about this because I was pondering the reasoning myself today.

https://blog.mukunda.com/cat/2023/refreshing-access-tokens.txt

Essentially, I think the main security boost is only there if the refresh token does not remain the same over its lifetime.

Let s say someone steals your tokens from your browser cookies because they had access to your device temporarily.

If they use the refresh token, and the refresh token changes, then you have feedback – you are logged out. That can seem rightfully suspicious to careful users who can then take action and revoke all tokens.

If the refresh token doesn t update upon each use, then it is harder to notice that someone has access in tandem. (Chances are, if does update, then it might update from your device automatically before the attacker can even get to use it.)

If the refresh token does not get updated each time you use it, then I don t see any boost in security from the strategy, since it will be right next to the access token and client secrets.

So, why access tokens? It is so you can check that your credentials are valid regularly.

Do refresh tokens expire? Yes, but usually after a few months if you have "remember me" ticked. There s no expiration time in the spec, so you just go until it fails. Services that require longer unmonitored sessions might have secret credentials so they can refresh their refresh token.

Update:

I also glossed through the OAuth 2.0 specification and see the same reasoning, though it emphasizes that the invalid authentication feedback can be caught on the server side. That is a great point – the server can automate revoking the token if it is compromised.

If a refresh token is compromised and subsequently used by both the attacker and the legitimate client, one of them will present an invalidated refresh token, which will inform the authorization server of the breach.